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The construction sector in Portugal declined sharply over the past 10 years. The current crisis can wiped out the entire 
industry. Can the industry survive? What lessons can we learn? What can be done to revive the sector? These are questions 
this study intends to answer. By analyzing the best practices of the industry and of the largest construction companies in 
Portugal, as well as the difficulties and constrains that they all faced, I found that retrenchment (operational costs and 
selling assets) are the main measures companies resort to, and that strategic reorientation is essential to turnaround. I found 
that internationalization is a key driver on strategic reorientation and diversification and concentration are complementary 
strategies that can enforce and strengthen the main one. 
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1 – Introduction 
The current global financial crisis provides a call for restructuring and cost cutting. But 
cutting back and hunkering down may get firms through the short term crisis but will not 
position them to the future. Managers must repositioning and lead firms and industry not 
just through the crisis but also redefine how business will be conducted in the long run. 
The aim of this study is to bring a comprehensive overview of firm strategy in the context 
of recessionary environments and structural breaks, focusing on the Portuguese construction 
sector. In fact, despite the episodic pervasiveness of recessions and their destructive impact 
on firms, very little sectoral research has addressed how managers from construction firms 
can successfully navigate these treacherous events. 
The first section synthesizes the lessons available for business turnarounds in previous 
recessionary environments and summarizes the most common and successful recovery 
strategies. Then a new section give us a quick snapshot of the Portuguese construction sector 
over the last years and its current situation as well as its future prospects. Another section 
analyzes the best practices of the industry and of the largest construction companies in 
Portugal, its difficulties and its constrains over the last decade. Strategic reorientation 
(internationalization, concentration and diversification) and retrenchment (namely financial 
restructuring) are key aspects this study identify as essential to firms overcome crisis and 
achieve turnaround. Each of these features is analyzed individually in specific sections. 
This study intends to make a contribution to a better understanding of how managers can 
make survive and revive an entire industry that can be wiped out if nothing changes.  
2 - Business turnaround in periods of crisis: a literature review 
Economic recessions represent the most transformative event faced by organizations. 
Research has demonstrated that recessions dramatically transform and many times wipe out 
industry landscapes. Prior studies consistently identify five effective turnaround strategies 





cutting and financial restructuring); Asset retrenchment measures; Focusing on core 
activities; Strategy reorientation; Leadership and culture change. 
Cost efficiencies measures (Cost cutting and financial restructuring) 
Cost efficiency measures are considered indispensible in achieving turnaround and are 
almost the first step in any recovery strategy. They can be quickly implemented, may have 
an almost immediate effect, and generally require little or no capital/resource investment 
(Hofer, 1980; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
The aim is to stabilize finances in the short-term until more complex strategies are built, 
or to quickly improve cash flow (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; 
Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001). 
Cost efficiencies commonly reported in the literature include reducing R&D, collecting 
and reducing accounts receivable, cutting inventory, stretching accounts payable, reducing 
marketing activity, eliminating pay increases, reducing other selling,  general,  and  
administrative expenses (SGA),  adjusting wage incentives, tighter stock control, 
encourage greater efficiencies and simplify processes. 
These were frequently accompanied by financial restructuring such as a reworking of the 
capital structure so as to relieve pressure from debt repayments and interest expenses. 
All these cost cutting measures should not be blind and should be reconsidered after a 
suitable length of time, so as not to damage assets or resources and to keep employee 
commitment at high levels. Indeed some studies present evidence that firms which were 
unsuccessful in their turnaround efforts over-pursued cost efficiencies (Boyne and Meier, 
2009). Similarly, cutting R&D costs alone is unlikely to be a major contributor to 
turnaround and, furthermore, may weaken the firm for the future. 
Asset retrenchment measures 
Asset retrenchment is the natural second step following cost efficiencies (Robbins and 





and equity carve-outs), and reducing stocks of property, equipment, and inventory.  
Business areas that are underperforming are evaluated to determine if efficiencies can be 
achieved, or whether it is best to divest the asset completely (Hofer 1980; Morrow et al., 
2007). Many times the rationality behind asset retrenchment is survival and the need to 
stem the bleeding (Gopinath, 1991), compromising many times future strategic options. 
The success of asset retrenchment as a component of a turnaround strategy depends on 
the firm’s ability to generate cash flow from any disposal. Difficulties surrounding disposal 
and cash generation may arise due to asset specificity, market liquidity, fire sale pressure 
and exit barriers (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006). 
Pearce and Robbins (1993) argued that managers should choose between cost and asset 
retrenchment contingent upon the severity of the decline. That is, more severe situations call 
for asset reductions in the retrenchment phase, while less severe situations may be stabilized 
by cost retrenchment alone. In fact, many times retrenchment is viewed as a consequence of 
a steep performance decline, suggesting that it is an activity that managers are more or less 
forced into when internal firm resources become extremely restricted (Whetten, 1987; 
Cameron et al, 1988). As such, firms facing turnaround situations will have several levels of 
pressure to retrench depending on the severity of their performance decline. 
Focusing on core activities 
Closely related to asset retrenchment is the strategy of focusing in core activities. This 
strategy implies determining the markets, products and customers that have the potential to 
generate the greatest profits and refocusing the firms activities on these areas. Focus 
allows the firm to develop a clear competitive strategy in its chosen core activities. (Boyne 
and Meier 2009; Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Robbins and Pearce, 1993). 
Strategy reorientation 
Many times strategy reorientation is linked only with a recovery phase of the turnaround 





viewed as the prerequisite for turnaround. But retrenchment can miss the strategic core of 
the problems. Strategy reorientation it is about positioning for long-term growth rather 
than short-term day-to-day survival, and these issues can be addressed at any moment. 
Despite the severe nature of their decline, companies should be very much concerned with 
implementing a suitable strategic reorientation in the course of their path. 
Recovery activities refer to strategic changes that transform and reposition the firm for 
sustained growth and profitability. These activities include market penetration, product 
launch, market entry, acquisitions, product-market scope alterations, structure and control 
systems changes, diversification and repositioning, structural change, and so forth 
(Bibeault, 1982; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
While retrenchment focuses on increasing efficiency through cost and asset reductions, 
recovery concentrates on improving a firm’s market position through strategic change. 
Since research describes retrenchment and recovery as contradictory forces (Pearce and 
Robbins, 2008), turnaround firms should opt for one or the other (Hofer, 1980), or to 
address them sequentially (Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
Leadership and culture change 
CEO change and replacement of part or all of the top management team is significantly 
linked to firms in distress and can serve as a signal of change to external audience and 
internally to the employees (Daily and Dalton, 1995). Further, companies have a greater 
capacity for strategic change when CEOs are replaced since new leaders are more likely to 
break the "old rules" and to be less committed to past policies. It is often identified as a pre-
condition for culture change and for almost all successful turnarounds (Hofer, 1980). 
3 – The Portuguese Construction Sector: an overview 
In the next pages it will be given a quick snapshot of the Portuguese Construction Sector 





 The contribution to the economy is best measured by its gross value added (GVA). 
In 2013 the construction sector accounted for 4.3% of Portuguese GVA, half of what 
represented in 2000. In the last thirteen years, while the economy GVA grew at an 
average annual rate of 0,35%, the GVA of the construction sector decreased at an 
average annual rate of more than 5,2%. Since 2001 the sector has recorded successive 
falls, especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Appendix 2. 
 The construction sector employed in 2013 more than 320 thousand people, representing 
6,5% of employment in the economy, compared to 12% in 2000. In the last thirteen 
years, the sector has lost about 300 thousand jobs, registering a negative average annual 
growth rate of 5%. Since the 2008 crisis, the sector recorded a loss of more than 230 
thousand people, of which more than 140 thousand on last 2 years. Appendix 3. 
 In 2012, the construction sector was one of the economic activities that concentrated the 
highest number of unemployed. Over the past five years the unemployed in the 
construction sector grew at an average annual rate of over 25%, and the rise has 
accelerated sharply in the last two years. Appendix 4. 
 In 2013 the domestic investment in the construction sector was about 40% of the value 
recorded in 2000 (11,3 against 26,6 thousand million €). Representing about two-thirds 
of investment in the economy in 2000, the investment in the construction sector 
decreased at an average rate of over 6% in the last thirteen years and more than 10% in 
the last five, representing now less than 50% of total domestic investment. Appendix 5. 
 In 2013, Portugal was the 21th EU country in terms of contribution of the construction 
sector to the Gross Value Added (Table 1), with a share of 4,3%, while in 2000 it was 
the 2nd with a value of 9,1%, second only to Spain. In terms of employment the 
situation is not so reversed, with the sector representing 6,5% of employment in 2013, 






Table 1 - EU Ranking: Gross Value Added and Employment (Building & construction as % of total) 
 
 According to Coface (a worldwide leader in credit insurance), in 2012, the construction 
sector, which weighed about 8% in companies established in Portugal, concentrated 20% 
of the shares of insolvency in the country (the sector with the highest weight in total).  
 The construction sector in Portugal, as in other EU countries, is traditionally based on a 
business structure with small businesses (Figure 1) and often resorting to subcontracting 
schemes. On the other hand, there is a group of larger firms despite representing only 
0.1% of companies in the sector and less than 13% of all staff, accounted for over a third 
of the turnover of companies in the construction sector. 
Figure 1 - Construction sector by size (2011) 
 
 The main thread in the construction sector, which accounts for 60% of employment in 
the sector, is the residential market, the segment most affected by global economic crisis 
(-44% decrease between 2010/12). There is also an oversupply in this segment. 
Construction of non-residential buildings, mainly of private nature, particularly in 
segments of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, was also very affected (-41% between 
2010/12). Civil Engineering Works are very linked with the public investment that 
suffered a sharp reduction (more than 20% between 2010/12) due to financial constrains 
of the public sector. Appendix 6. 
Country 2000 Rank 2005 Rank 2010 Rank 2013 Rank
Spain 10,3% 1 13,6% 1 10,7% 1 7,8% 2
Portugal 9,1% 2 7,6% 7 5,8% 17 4,3% 21
Cyprus 8,8% 3 11,0% 2 8,9% 4 4,0% 24
Country 2000 Rank 2005 Rank 2010 Rank 2013 a) Rank
Portugal 11,9% 1 10,8% 2 10,3% 1 6,5% 7
Spain 9,6% 2 11,1% 1 7,9% 4 5,8% 15 a)
Luxembourg 9,2% 3 10,1% 4 10,0% 2 9,7% 1
Source: AMECO a) year 2012
Gross value added at current prices: building and construction as % of total





4 - Portuguese recovery strategies 
Despite strongly aggravated by the current financial crisis, the situation of the 
Construction sector is the result of a deep and prolonged recession starting in 2000. During 
this long period crisis, construction sector did not restructured itself, but reduced 
investments, reduced margins, indebted up, decapitalized itself, and faced financial 
difficulties induced by the credit constraints from both clients (individuals, businesses and 
state) and construction firms, by shrinking margins and by payment delays. The majority of 
companies retained employment till 2008, hoping to seize the long-awaited recovery in the 
sector, that never happened. After 2008 the drop in employment was sharp and destructive. 
A new strategic orientation for the sector is required. 
The review of the best practices of the industry and of the largest construction companies 
in Portugal: Mota-Engil (ME), Teixeira Duarte (TD), Soares da Costa (SdC), Elevo Fund 
(Elevo), as well as the difficulties and constrains that they all have faced, provide clues and 
some answers to find strategic priorities/axis that may guide the strategic reorientation of the 
construction sector in Portugal: Diversification; Internationalization; and Concentration. 
But this study also focuses the main measures and tactics companies can resort to before any 
successful turnaround: Retrenchment measures (financial Restructuration, asset 
retrenchment, operating efficiency). These measures, due to the financial weakness of the 
entire sector in Portugal, have proven to be of enormous importance to this work and for the 
proper understanding of the turnaround process in Portuguese firms. The consistency of the 
Portuguese practices and the findings in the literature review will also be analyzed. 
According to information from the data base for the Bank Accounts of Companies 
Harmonized (BACH-www.bach.banque-france.fr), summarized in table 2, on average, large 
Portuguese companies in the construction sector compare favorably with their European 
counterparts (2012) regarding margin arising from its operating activities (per each € of 





most other countries (Portugal 5,3% and Spain -15,6% with the worse returns), a situation 
that is due in large measure to the financing structure, characterized by low financial 
autonomy and high dependence on debt capital, particularly for loans with credit 
institutions. These findings are the starting point for the analysis described below. 
Table 2 - European construction companies comparative results 
 
4.1. – Retrenchment: Operational costs and selling assets 
In a crisis the priority is to generate cash flow (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick and Schecter, 
1983; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) in order to compensate and pay off the enormous debt, 
meaning that there is no scope for developing other strategies that involves capital. In 
Portugal, the operational efficiencies gains and the reducing on operating costs (Table 3) has 
been achieved at the expense of lower costs on external service supplies ("FSE" Portuguese 
accounting). This sector lives much on the basis of subcontracting, so unlike other sectors, is 
relatively easy to reduce costs without resorting to layoffs (micro and small enterprises were 
those that suffered such consequences) and force increases in productivity within the 
company. The higher the company the higher is the proportion of the company "FSE" on 
operational costs (66% in large companies). Personnel costs only fall after 2012 on large 
companies when it was no longer possible to avoid the breaking of the activity and 
70,0% 8,2% 2,7% 9,8%
40,3% 6,0% 8,2% N.A.
28,1% 8,3% 8,1% 18,9%
22,9% 3,9% 11,9% 26,2%
20,9% 10,2% 7,9% 19,9%
17,6% 7,1% 18,2% 13,9%
16,1% 4,4% 21,5% 11,2%
12,1% 11,9% -15,6% 51,2%
22,4% 15,3% 5,3% 39,5%
184,9 89,3 111,9
102,8 132,9 94,6
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Belgium 5,3%
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companies began to lay off. However in large companies relocating employees to other 
geographies prevented the intensive use of such measures.  
Table 3 - Operational Costs in the Construction sector 
 
Table 4 – ME: Operational Costs                                       Table 5 – ME: Tangible assets & investments 
 
Mota-Engil is a very good example of these peculiarities. The strategy of Mota-Engil has 
been to mobilize equipment and employees to other geographic areas where activity was 
increasing and reallocate resources in anticipation of the expected slowdown of activity in 
Portugal and with the objective of resource optimization. In general, operational costs, 
number of workers and assets are increasing, but at the same time the international mobility 
and the reduction of subcontracts is notorious (between 2010 and 2013: 7% fall on the 
number of workers in Europe and 84% rise in other external markets; 80% fall in 
subcontracts costs in Europe; 28% fall in equipment in Europe in contrast with the 226% 
rise in other external markets). Table 4 and 5 summarizes these results (appendix 7 and 8 
for information on other companies). 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Construction Sector Small and Medium Large Companies
3,8% -8,2% 0,2% -12,6% -26,3% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
-1,3 -5,5 -1,9 -3,6 -6,8 25,3% 26,2% 18,2%
3,9 -1,8 2,9 -7,6 -16,0 52,5% 47,8% 66,0%
1,2 -0,9 -0,8 -1,4 -3,5 22,2% 26,0% 15,9%
Source: Banco de Portugal
Annual grow th rate (%) and contributions (b.p.) Operarting activ ity  structure (2012)
Operating costs (grow th rate)
Materials and Consumptions
Ex ternal supplies / serv ices
Personnel Costs
€ Millions € Millions
2013 2012 2011 2010 2013 2012 2011 2010
28 345 26 161 20 653 19 404 691 613 565 569
8,3% 26,7% 6,4% 12,6% 8,7% -0,8%
7 550 9 395 7 758 8 123 261 248 234 226
14 359 9 709 375 338 309 310
6 007 6 616     Europe 48,4% 78,3% 79,4% 80,8%
429 441 1 776 6 060     Africa 42,0% 15,2% 14,3% 15,2%
2 013 2 026 1 964 1 875     America 9,3% 6,1% 5,5% 3,3%
-0,6% 3,2% 4,7%     Other & Eliminations 0,2% 0,4% 0,7% 0,7%
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 323 324 285 446
21,0% 24,8% 23,1% 17,7% -0,3% 13,7% -36,1%
56,8% 54,7% 57,9% 63,2% 55 66 63 89
Subcontracts 31,9% 31,8% 36,7% 45,0% 218 219 217 337
    Europe 6,7% 19,6% 29,2% 35,9% 50 39 5 21
    Other Regions 25,1% 12,2% 7,5% 9,2% Source: Report and accounts 2009-2013
22,2% 20,6% 19,0% 19,1%
    Europe 8,7% 10,8% 10,8% 16,8%
    Other Regions 13,5% 9,8% 8,2% 2,3%
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EBITDA margins (Table 6) are at the level of the best in class within the global 
construction industry (2013: ME 15,7%, TD 13,5% ). Teixeira-Duarte in a movement of 
market anticipation and great intuition, sold in 2010 its 22,17% stake in Cimpor to Camargo 
Corrêa by 968,4 Million, which allowed TD to significantly lower its debt (about -45%) and 
ensure several degrees of freedom on its operations during the financial crisis in Portugal. 
Table 6 – Financial Ratios 
 
Soares da Costa resized the structure in Portugal in order to adjust to the decreasing 
turnover in this market. Within this scope, emphasizes the reduction of its personnel 
structure (988 workers between 2010 and 2012) and fusion of several subsidiaries. Staff 
costs are still influenced by labour contracts terminations costs on SdC. There was a clear 
refocusing on the core activities of the company. Non core equity and participations, 
investment properties and other assets were now divested (a movement in the opposite 
direction of 2011-2013 strategy of higher diversification). But all these measures were not 
sufficient to stop the bleeding. 
Soares da Costa already in 2014 sold the US construction business to focus all interests in 
the area of construction exclusively in the minority position in SdC Construção (since Feb 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2013 a) 2012 2011 2010
15,7% 12,8% 13,6% 11,8% 27,6% 9,0% 10,8% 9,9%
15,8% 17,0% 33,1% 14,4% -149,7% -89,3% 2,0% 11,5%
14,8% 12,1% 6,1% 13,9% 3,5% 3,0% 6,6% 8,4%
85,2% 87,9% 93,9% 86,1% 96,5% 97,0% 93,4% 91,6%
5,7 7,3 15,4 6,2 27,6 32,7 14,1 10,9
2,7 3,0 3,4 4,3 19,0 14,2 9,2 8,3
28,7% 30,1% 27,5% 25,4% 120,4% 107,1% 59,1% 52,7%
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
13,5% 15,1% 9,8% 10,9% 16,1%
17,9% 8,0% -65,4% 7,0% 22,3%
13,0% 11,8% 12,1% 20,7% 14,7%
87,0% 88,2% 87,9% 79,3% 85,3%
6,7 7,5 7,3 3,8 5,8
5,5 4,7 7,9 7,1 9,4
42,0% 37,4% 63,7% 38,5% 33,1% Source: Report and accounts 2009-2013
a) On 2013 Grupo SdC accounts, the construction sector is classified as asset held for sale and as discontinued activity
Return on Equity  (ROE)
Financial Autonomy  (Equity /Assets)
Debt Ratio
Debt Equity  Ratio
Net Debt / EBITDA
Financial Pressure (Interest/EBITDA)
Debt Ratio
Debt Equity  Ratio
Net Debt / EBITDA
Financial Pressure (Interest/EBITDA)
Teix eira Duarte
EBITDA Margin (EBITDA/Turnov er)
Mota-Engil
EBITDA Margin (EBITDA/Turnov er)
Return on Equity  (ROE)






2014 after partnership with GAM, Soares da Costa sold 2/3 of this construction company), 
and possibly in a few years Grupo Soares da Costa will eventually abandon completely the 
construction business. 
4.2. – Retrenchment: need for financial restructuring 
The return on equity of construction (Table 7) has been negative last years and is 
typically lower than other NF (Non Financial) sectors. Due to the registration of consecutive 
negative results, 24.7% of construction companies have a negative equity in 2012, but only 
6.7% of large companies were in that situation. In fact, the equity return in large firms is 
positive (5.3%) although below the European, but even in large firms the situation is very 
dispar (Table 6), with companies like ME and TD with higher ROE (2013: 15,8% and 
17,9% respectively) and others like SdC with negative ROE (-149,7% in 2013). 
Table 7 - Return on Equity 
 
The typical financing structure is not much different from the other NF sectors and is 
characterized by high undercapitalization and low financing autonomy ratios (about 20% 
against 30% of NF sectors – Appendix 9A; 2013: ME 14,8%, TD 13,0%, SdC 3,5% - Table 
6). Mota-Engil has a debt equity ratio of 5,7, which is below its Portuguese competitors but 
still very high. This is a indicator of high leverage for the Portuguese companies.  
The debt capital plays an important role in financing the construction activity, situation 
that justifies a more detailed analysis of its features and its recent evolution. In fact, in recent 
years, companies in the construction sector show that they are very dependent on borrowed 
capital. The main sources of financing has been the financial debt and trade credits (76% of 
total in 2012). In the area of financial debt, bank loans were particularly relevant (38% of 
liabilities in 2012), especially in the segment of "building construction" (42% of liabilities in 










4,5% 4,0% 9,4% 2,8% -0,5% 29,2%
-2,0% -0,3% 3,3% -9,0% -8,4% -16,1% -9,4% 5,3% 24,7% 26,8% 9,4% 6,7%
Source: Banco de Portugal







2012) and the class of Small and Medium Size firms (44% of liabilities in 2012). The 
indebtedness grew till 2010, but the negative trend in activity in the last decade, especially 
in the last three years, resulted in significant reductions in bank loans (-20% in 2012) and 
trade credits (-22% in 2012). The financing by group companies, by contrast, have grown 
(+8,6% in 2012). Appendix 9A/B. This general analysis is confirmed by similar results on 
individual large firms: 
Figure 2 – Liabilty Structure 
 
The high amount of capital required and the substantial time lag that occurs between the 
time of award and payment (specially with state and local authorities) means that companies 
often have a need to borrow large bank credits that are responsible for their shrinking 
margins (in the form of bank interest and guarantee fees). Credit institutions (CI) in Portugal 
traditionally have a high exposure to the construction sector, but between 2009 and 2012, 
the loans granted by the CI sector dropped 25.2% (double of the NF sectors). In fact, the 
financial sector has huge impairments related to credit to the construction sector. More and 
more construction companies are in default situation (about 44% of companies) and with 
increasing overdue loans ratios (23.7% in 2012). Appendix 10 / 11. 
The average financial pressure (weight of interest in EBITDA) of the sector is historically 
high (Table 8). EBITDA generated in the last three years (2011-2013) was not enough to 
cover the interest costs for businesses. The sector is no longer able to generate income to 
cope the cost of financing. Soares da Costa is a good example of this situation, in fact, in 
general terms and taking into consideration the company's dimension and structure, is 





positive profitability. Furthermore, the effect of the financial constrains and financial 
pressure (107% in 2012) disturbed the operational and commercial activity effectiveness. 
Mota-Engil (28,7%) and Teixeira Duarte (42,0%) are in the line with the average financial 
pressure ratio of large companies (Table 6). 
Table 8 - Financial Pressure and Solvability 
 
Considering the high financial pressure on the construction sector, it is important to 
assess the ability of companies to comply with the short-term obligations: with a reduced 
liquidity ratio of 76% (Table 8)  is a sign of a huge pressure in terms of solvability. 
Another important issue is commercial credit,  given its importance as a source of 
funding on the construction sector (15% of liabilities, but if we consider only large 
companies the weight rises to 27%). The sector has average collection and payment periods 
far superior to other sectors (especially in micro companies) and they are deteriorating 
(extending time) in last years. The average periods give an indication of the time delay 
associated with receipts and payments of debts arising from operating activities, but do not 
indicate the degree of indebtedness of the companies in this way. It is necessary to 
complement this analysis with the Net financing by commercial debt which is negative, 
meaning that the construction sector is not obtaining net financing via commercial credits. 
Appendix 12. 
What have been the responses of large firms to this financial distress? The financial 
strategy to achieve a sustainable growth of the companies began by reducing the maturity of 
2008 26,5% 58,8% Solvability
2009 22,7% 47,3%





2011 28,2% 132,3% 153,0% 122,2% 125,5%
2012 37,2% 133,3% 39,5% 50,7% 76,2% 119,6%








Weight of the interest paid on EBITDA (Financial Pressure)
Number of firms w ith EBIDTA < Interest Paid (%)
Interest 














the debt (lowering the weight of short-term debt), optimization of the debt exposure to 
national and international banks and diversification of sources of funding (other than bank 
debt). In all the big companies there was a significant increase in debt maturity (Figure 3) 
with transfer from short term to medium and long term, hoping that increases in sales in the 
future will enable them to fulfill their future obligations. 
Figure 3 – Maturity Structure 
 
In respect with optimization/diversification of funding sources, Mota-Engil gave a step 
forward. In 2013 decided to change its corporate structure by dividing it into 3 geographical 
regions: Europe, Africa and South America. On the other hand, the Financial Management 
and Human Resources will be concentrated in Mota-Engil SGPS, leaving the operationality 
of the financial strategy and human resources to existing structures in each geographical 
area. This change from business areas (old structure was organized as business sectors) to 
geographical regions, was justified by the different social/legal and business context that 
each region is inserted in. But does not make much sense in a corporate strategy perspective, 
since a corporate advantage was better achieved with a business segment division than with 
a geographical division. The main reason behind this change is economic: Africa achieved a 
significant growth in recent years, among other reasons, driven by exploration and 
development of natural resources in the region. Mota-Engil understands that achieves 
greater visibility if it can show separately the African business and thereby satisfy 
international investors eager to specific significant investments in this region. Thus, the 
eventual dispersion of about 30% of the capital of this autonomous body in Africa may 
mean funding on better terms (higher sale price) for the Group: according to the prospectus 
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of offer the IPO would translate into a market value of 1.06/1.33 billion pounds (€ 1,36/1,71 
billion), based on 115 million shares outstanding (100%). 
Thus, the new Organizational Model aims to accelerate the pace of internationalization 
and enhance the ability of the Group to funding abroad (this funding concern is a pressing in 
any organization, especially in the economic and financial situation that Portugal is facing), 
becoming the structure increasingly prepared for the establishment of regional companies. 
Since, many of the projects are abroad, ME is starting to finance itself in international 
institutions instead of Portuguese banks. ME creates subsidiaries abroad to be able to give 
assets as collaterals. 
In my findings Mota-Engil and Teixeira Duarte, typically maintained lower leverage 
(compared with industry) on their balance sheets, controlled operating costs well, and 
diversified their product offerings and business geographies. Such fundamentals gave them 
capacity for taking advantage of opportunities and a greater degree of strategic flexibility, 
which became even more valuable during the recession. In addition, they were able to pay 
their suppliers and subcontractors faster, probably in an effort to negotiate lower prices and 
better service, thus rising their profitability.  
Soares da Costa was a complete different story. The SdC Group is one of the largest 
groups of Portuguese construction sector, with over 90 years of history and over 30 years of 
experience in the international market, with regular activity in Portugal, Angola, 
Mozambique and USA. Since 2002 the activity of the Group is organized by business areas 
(construction, concessions, real estate and energy) with construction as the core business of 
the Group. The growth of international turnover (which accounted for about 57% of the 
portfolio in 2010, and 71% in 2013 - Appendix 17) and a step into diversification were not 
enough to offset the drop (since 2009) in turnover in Portugal. Operating margin of 
construction (core activity) deteriorated since 2012. In other areas of business, margins did 





The financial results have worsened since 2010, following the increasing level of 
indebtedness. Net bank debt has been growing over the past five years , reaching € 1 Billion 
in 2012 (about half of this debt relates to project finance funding) - Appendix 9B. The net 
debt (Table 6) is growing to very high levels (14,2 x EBITDA in 2012, 8,9 x EBITDA if we 
only account for the corporate net debt excluding the project finance debt and its EBITDA 
effect), both due to increasing debt and due to a drop in EBITDA. 
In fact, Soares da Costa since 2008 was involved in projects of expansion (investment in 
Self Energy), significant projects in public-private partnerships (PPP) and organic growth, 
which involved much debt. Thus, the level of debt is a major constrain for the activity, 
Soares da Costa lost the ability to access any additional funding and to finance new works, 
and on the other hand, the cost of debt weighs greatly in its accounts. A recession with no 
ability to fund was fatal. Several investments were already been postponed (as the energy 
sector), in fact, the insufficient capital was threatening not only the expansions prospects but 
also the ongoing projects. 
Soares da Costa needed an urgent corporate and financial restructuring, so the group 
build a strategic partnership with António Mosquito, an Angolan businessman that took a 
majority position in the core segment of the Group (construction), through a capital increase 
in the sub-holding SdC SGPS Construction in the amount of € 70 Million, equivalent to a 
stake of 66.7% in the capital and voting rights of SdC Construction SGPS. Soares da Costa 
Group now holds a minority stake in its main operation, which is the area of construction. 
The position at SdC SGPS Construction no longer consolidates and is classified as assets 
held for sale, the group become essentially a shareholdings managing type of holding, with 
some importance in the areas of concessions (motorways and water) and real estate. 
The capital increase of € 70 million was applied in (i) the reduction of debts to suppliers 
(€ 40m for immediate payment to restore trust and relationship with suppliers), (ii) 





restructuring (€ 5m). There was also a financial restructuring considering a 10% haircut 
(about € 20,4 Million) on the debt in Portugal with CGD (€ 134,7 Million) and the 
Millennium bcp (€ 69 Million) and restructuring the remaining debt to 10 years with 5 years 
grace period (annual reimbursement from the 6th year) and a fee of interest corresponding to 
the 6-month Euribor plus a spread of 1.5% in the first 3 years and 3% thereafter (this last 
condition was extended to all other Portuguese banks). 
With these changes the main advantages obtained were the strengthening in the capital 
structure, the enhancement of working capital, including the settlement of suppliers, the 
support for operational restructuring, the support for the development of the activity in the 
main market (Angola), and other African markets with high potential, the increased 
confidence on the part of the company's stakeholders (creditors, customers, suppliers, 
employees) and above all the continuity of operations. 
In general the financial restructuring is common to all companies studied, but in different 
models and in different degrees. The different circumstances of each and decisions made 
over time allowed different degrees of freedom of action in each of them. The enormous 
growth of construction in Africa and the historical presence of Mota-Engil in the region was 
vital to its success. The huge diversification in TD over the last 20 years and the sale of 
Cimpor which allowed TD to reduce debt in almost half were also critical success factors. 
But in all these firms retrenchment is a process of survival (Gopinath, 1991) and an activity 
that all of them were more or less forced into due to the severity of their performance decline 
(Whetten, 1987; Cameron et al, 1988). Firms were forced to cost cutting measures (Hofer, 
1980; Robbins and Pearce, 1992), to sell assets (Robbins and Pearce, 1992), to manage cash 
flows (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) and to 
rework their capital structure.  
In conclusion construction companies, in general, need a strong financial restructuring 





relieve pressure), to restructure their debts with an haircut in many cases, and to strengthen 
the capital in order to capitalize. If necessary (due to cash flow needs) companies should 
sale assets (Robbins and Pearce, 1992) and focalize in their core activities (Boyne and 
Meier 2009; Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Robbins and Pearce, 1993). These findings are in 
line with the literature review: retrenchment is essential to any kind of turnaround process.  
4.3. – Internationalization 
The volume of international business of most of European construction companies is 
originated in its own region markets - Europe accounted for approximately 47.5% of the 
amount in question in 2011. For Portuguese companies, however, the European market 
accounts for only 15.6% of its turnover abroad, making Portugal, along with Germany as the 
country with the highest percentage of international turnover from outside Europe (about 
85%). According to European International Contractors, while to the average of European 
construction firms Africa represents only 8.6% of its international business, for Portuguese 
companies represent more than 75%, revealing the importance of this market to Portugal, 
not replicable to any other European country. In that region, Portugal has the second largest 
share of the turnover of European construction companies, with more than 23%, only being 
surpassed by France, which assumes 29%. Also noteworthy is the strengthening of the 
Portuguese presence in Central and Southern America which takes the 3rd largest European 
involvement in the region. Appendix 15. 
Internationalization is in fact a reality in the larger Portuguese construction companies 
(about 86% of the international business sector is held by the top ten), a successful process 
as we can verify by the average annual growth rate of 33% in the volume of international 
business of Portuguese companies over the period 2004-2012. The value of 2012 more than 
sixfold the value of 2004. New contracts standing ahead of turnover in almost every year  is 





While internal market is losing weight fast (40/50% share in 2010 to 20/30% share in 
2013 - Appendix 17) and decreasing at a pace around -20% every year, external market 
(mainly Africa) is growing huge and gaining weight (on last 2 years: ME 57,4% and TD 
80,2%). If was not external markets Portuguese companies would be dead already. The 
importance of external markets it's more in its growth and weight than in its margins (Table 
9), not so different from the internal market and in some more sophisticated markets (Latin 
America and Europe) with lower margins due to the strong competition in those markets. 
Even in Africa, Portuguese companies show often noncompetitive prices against 
competition from China, Brazil or India, so margins tend to reduce. 
Figure 4 - Turnover by region 
 
Table 9 – ME: EBIDTA Margin by region 
 
The entry of Chinese construction companies in the Angolan market, boosted by strong 
support from the Chinese government, had natural repercussion in terms of market share. 
The turning point came in 2004 when the Angolan government negotiated with China a line 
of credit that provides that 70% of the reconstruction works are awarded to Chinese 
companies and only 30% remain in the hands of local construction companies. After some 
time, Portuguese companies were gradually regaining their space, although the Angolan 
market for public works remain highly competitive. Apparently, the Portuguese construction 
2013 2012 2011 2010
15,7% 12,8% 13,6% 11,8%
    Portugal 18,1% 15,2% 14,7% 11,4%
    Europe -8,6% 0,0% 4,3% 4,0%
    Africa 24,2% 18,7% 17,6% 16,4%
    America 8,3% 10,6% 8,6% 6,2%
    Ex ternal Market 14,8% 11,5% 12,5% 12,3% Source: Report and accounts 2009-2013
Mota-Engil





companies, especially larger ones, will not have been the most affected, given its 
consolidated presence in the Angolan market, the ability of communication and integration, 
and certain dissatisfaction with the quality of the Chinese public works (including 
construction materials). 
Mota-Engil has been the largest Portuguese civil and public construction contractor since 
the merger of Mota and Engil in 2000. It was founded in 1946 by Manuel António da Mota, 
and in that same year a subsidiary in Angola was also created. This historical bond with the 
African market would turn out to be a key strength for the group in the latest years, as 
Europe is facing a tough recession. In Angola, ME build a privileged strategic position over 
68 years, benefiting from an important alliance with the state-owned company Sonangol. 
Mota-Engil is nowadays present in 19 different countries around the world. International 
markets now represent nearly 73,5% of the turnover of the group (Figure 4), which is very 
notable since construction represents 87% of the entire portfolio of activities (Figure 5). The 
international markets for Teixeira Duarte represents nearly 81%, but in a very diversified 
portfolio, where construction only weights 50%. 
Companies must learn from this experience because internationalization is a way to 
circumvent the constraints of the internal market (dimension and current crisis) and make 
use of existing opportunities in targeted foreign markets (with favorable economic 
developments and significant investments in infrastructures and real estate). Of course there 
are political risks and the problem of local compulsory partnerships (often inaccessible to 
small companies), mainly in Africa. But that is something they have to live with, since 
Portuguese companies will never have dimension to enter and compete in more friendly 
markets (but more sophisticated and with fierce competition) like Europe and America. 
Large companies in Portugal have already an historical presence and experience in Africa 





larger ones (subcontracts), these small companies can benefit from that prior special 
relationship and using the same strategy gain presence and market in other geographies.  
4.4. – Diversification 
So as to major European construction companies, also for major Portuguese companies in 
the sector, the internationalization and diversification of its activities has emerged as 
cornerstones of its evolution and as part of its strategies to ensure its sustainability and 
growth. The international business on major companies in the sector grew at a fairly high 
rate in recent years, and about 90% of those larger companies were already operating in 
other businesses aside from construction (more than 70% were present in the concessions 
and real estate, more than 50% in industry and environment and more than 40% in tourism 
and energy). Appendix 19. 
Figure 4 - Turnover by segment 
 
During the past few years, diversification into other businesses and geographies has been 
at the core of Mota-Engil and Teixeira Duarte group’s strategies as a mean to achieve 
sustainable growth and a higher consolidated EBITDA margin (achieve higher margins and 
constant/stable cash flows). 
In addition to the heavy construction core business, Mota-Engil has diversified into the 
industries of environment and services (E&S, including tourism, ports, logistics, energy), 
transport concessions (ME reorganized the transports concessions sector by transferring all 
the assets and concessions to a newly formed company named Ascendi Group, in which ME 
have a 60% equity stake) and more recently mining. Through a 37.5% stake in the 
Portuguese company Martifer, the company is also present in the metallic construction and 





Construction still represents a great part in their turnover (87%), mostly due to the 
development of the African and Southern American construction sectors. E&S is losing 
weight on total turnover, because it is growing at an inferior rate than the international 
construction business, thus representing a minor % of the total pie. If we remove the impact 
of globalization, the effect of diversification would be much more visible. 
By contrast, Teixeira Duarte is a very high diversified company, where construction only 
weights 50% and with interests in diverse areas like real estate, hotels, concessions, 
distribution, energy and auto. Real Estate and Hotel services with margins of more than 30% 
and distribution with margins above construction helped to rise overall margin of the group. 
Diversification was never very high in Portuguese firms (with the exception of Teixeira-
Duarte), with construction segment or related segments (concessions) accounting with more 
than 85% of total turnover. One reason is the rising weight of international construction 
segment. Other reason is the lack of human resources (management, capabilities, know-
how) to diversify to other segments. With the crisis another reason arise: lack of capital 
(SdC in 2010 decided to diversified to the renewable energy sector due to its highly 
attractive historical profitability margins, but less than 2 years later the strategies guidelines 
were reoriented to construction sector and financial sustainability as this study shows in 
previous sections). However companies must learn from these experiences because 
diversification can ensure sustainability and growth by seizing new business opportunities 
and by gaining the benefits arising from synergies. Construction companies must become 
multi-activity firms as a way to achieve higher margins and constant/stable cash flows, a 








Diversification can be also achieved inside the construction sector, by refocusing the 
industry internally: change from new construction to rehabilitation and maintenance (weight 
of 24% against an average of 53% in Europe in 2011 - “Associação Portuguesa 
Construção”), which requires greater qualification of professionals and businesses. The 
construction sector needs to reduce quantity and increase in quality. That means less 
business, but better companies and higher margins. 
4.5. – Concentration 
Table 10 - Top 50 European construction sector companies by turnover, Share by country, 2011 
 
The size of Portuguese companies is relatively small compared with European firms 
(Table 10), as can be seen by the fact that in 2011, only three are part of the European top 50 
(Source: Deloitte – “European Powers of Construction, 2011”). Also when analyzing the 
situation in an Iberian context it appears that Portuguese companies are regional in scope. 
The 2011 turnover of the three largest Portuguese companies together does not reach the 
volume of the fifth largest Spanish company business. 
Figure 6 - Shareholder Structure, 2013 
 
The largest construction companies in Portugal consider to be essential to promote the 
concentration in the sector, given that dimension is an essential support for the strengthening 
Share Cumulative Share Portugal
France 27,8% 27,8%          Mota-Engil 2.176 Millions €
Spain 21,3% 49,1%          Teixeira-Duarte 1.263 Millions €
United Kingdom 12,8% 61,9%          Soares da Costa 873 Millions €
Germany 10,9% 72,8% Spain
Others a) 27,2% 100,0%          ACS 28.472 Millions €
         FCC 11.755 Millions €
a) Portugal 1,4%          Ferrovial 7.446 Millions €
         Acciona 6.646 Millions €







of the processes of internationalization and diversification. This need is recognized by the 
vast majority of companies, but the movement was not initiated and it is unlikely to happen 
quickly, given the current limited financial capacity as well as the preponderance of family 
management companies (Figure 6). Mota-Engil (despite being the largest in Portugal) is still 
very small compared to other European players. This is a major obstacle to compete in the 
international markets (mainly in South America and Europe) and high-scale projects. In fact, 
Mota-Engil, Teixeira Duarte and Soares da Costa continue to be family companies (Equity 
Stake around 67/70%), a situation that can be seen in similar way in southern Europe, 
especially in Spain. 
Within the scope of consolidation in the sector, was established in March 2012, the Elevo 
Fund (whose shareholders are BES, BCP, CGD, MG and BANIF), which materialized the 
acquisition of Edifer, Monte Adriano, the Hagen and Eusébios, companies in the middle 
segment of the engineering and construction sector, with a total turnover that puts Elevo in 
the 4tht place in the national ranking of the sector. 
The strategy is simple: the fund will take control of medium sized bankrupt construction 
companies, being responsible for its debts (redemption will include the partial debt 
forgiveness by the main creditor banks - CGD, BES, BCP and Banif) and enabling the 
immediate injection of liquidity in construction. Then will seek to gain synergies with 
existing assets, forming a construction company with higher competitive ability (turnover 
close to € 800 Million). The fund's objective is not the recovery of companies alone, but the 
recovery of several companies to then proceed to their merger and concentration. 
Considering the low expression that the domestic market will have in the coming years, 
the group's strategy will boost by international expansion. This strategy will be supported 
primarily by the area of Construction and Engineering, which will necessarily lead to a sale 
or merger on operational areas that are not priorities, particularly the real estate component 





priority is to generate cash flow in order to compensate and pay off the enormous debt, 
meaning  that there is no scope for developing other areas of business that involves capital. 
Part of the strategy also involves reducing human resources, since in a merger there is 
always redundant functions, and because the national market is shrinking, which 
internationalization strategy allows to counterbalance, but not enough (because some 
markets impose quotes for expatriates). 
The Fund emerged not only as a project of sector consolidation (gain muscle and size to 
embrace new projects and markets) but also to decrease the exposure of banks, which 
through its participation in the fund, they expect to receive the values indebted. The banking 
sector was important in two ways. At first, funded the fund and created the conditions for a 
debt restructuring. In a second, created support mechanisms, such as bank guarantees and 
immediate liquidity injection. 
Much of the problems in the construction sector in Portugal derives from an overspray. 
All movements that existed to group different companies were consciously or unconsciously 
resisted by the sector itself. And many of these companies, when in 2011 are hit hard by the 
crisis, had no muscle, had no management, had no critical mass to be able to make that shift 
in their business angle. It's time to consolidate. 
The third fundamental axis for companies in the Portuguese, namely to address the two 
afore mentioned, is concentration, in order to win dimension, enhance skills, increase 
responsiveness and relevance (at the Iberian range), to increase the capacity of risk 
assumption, achieve synergies and create more value. 
4.6. – Strategic reorientation: synthesis 
In the last sections it was analyzed 3 turnaround strategies essential to the recovery 
process: Internationalization, Diversification and Concentration. A more visual 
understanding about the strategic reorientation for construction industry this study purposes 





Figure 7 - Strategic Reorientation for Construction Industry 
 
Strategic reorientation is once more in line with literature review about turnaround: those 
who change strategy were the winners in the long run (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992). But unlike what was expected, strategic reorientation was not a 
second step (Robbins and Pearce, 1992) but a prior decision in the most successful cases 
(Mota-Engil e Teixeira Duarte). Those with that lack of insight are now struggling and 
focused in the retrenchment stage as a prerequisite for turnaround (Filatotchev and Toms, 
2006; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). In meanwhile any recovery strategy is step aside or 
postponed and there is no available capital to internationalization, diversification or 
concentration. Companies are forced to be focus in their core activities. The priority is to 
generate cash flows (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Sudarsanam and 
Lai, 2001) in order to compensate and pay off the enormous debt, meaning that there is no 
scope for developing other strategies that involves capital. The process will be more difficult 
and will take longer, but what is important is that companies must know that they must 
change their way of doing business. 
A corporate crisis is often a sign that the company’s business model has petered out and 
the industry’s underlying structure has changed dramatically, so old ways of doing business 
no longer works, growth formula cannot be sustained, old pattern has been pushed to its 





of such a structural break and such a break means hard times and adjustments are neither 
easy nor quick. 
5 – Conclusion: The Portuguese construction industry in turnaround 
The complexity, confusion and uncertainty surrounding the global credit crisis and the 
global recession is so large that many companies may not survive. With contracting markets, 
frozen credit, high leverage and a deep economic crisis, many businesses today are fighting 
for their lives. Trying to save indiscriminately companies in the industry is a mistake. 
Portugal cannot spend more money on oxygen balloons to save archaic and unviable 
companies. With some exceptions, requiring the State to promote a new wave of investment 
in infrastructure and urban equipment, or resorting to the deviation of money of QREN from 
its original goals is not a good solution and hardly makes sense. The construction sector and 
real estate does not come out of the crisis by attracting more new construction, more 
urbanization and more financial resources of the State. The construction sector is an 
oversized sector and whose ongoing adjustments were predictable against the excesses of 
new construction in Portugal in the last two decades, whether of buildings or infrastructure. 
The sector is bankrupting, as a whole and very quickly. Small businesses dependent on 
real estate were the first to stop. Then large. And among large, only two are surviving the 
crisis, and only one of them is a "whole" construction company - Mota-Engil -, the other is 
Teixeira Duarte, with less than 50% of construction in its well diversified corporate 
portfolio: sold Cimpor, reduce its debt, diversified itself and between Brazilian oil and 
Angolan supermarkets, gained a new life. From Teixeira Duarte down, doesn't left any 
brick. The entire construction industry can be wiped out. 
Mota-Engil accounting with an extensive network of relationships (one of its main 
strategic resources build in decades) gained works in Portugal, Mozambique, Angola, 
Poland, Peru, Colombia and many others. Managers who prepare during good times can 





We can find same characteristics: When entering the downturn, Mota-Engil and Teixeira 
Duarte typically maintained lower leverage on their balance sheets, controlled operating 
costs well, and diversified their product offerings and business geographies. Such 
fundamentals gave them a greater degree of strategic flexibility, which became even more 
valuable during the recession. 
Below the two largest, is the impending disaster. Soares da Costa was with no funding 
and waiting to know their fate until the António Mosquito solution. And one day the entire 
construction segment might be out of the group and no longer a Portuguese company. 
Somague is submerged in problems. Lena, Abrantina, Opway, FDO are in line behind 
Edifer. Here comes the Vallis, the fund that absorbed Edifer, Monte Adriano, Hagen and 
Eusébios and is studying other distressed companies for additional mergers. A fund that 
aims to make a controlled dissolution of companies: shareholders lose everything, debt is 
negotiated with banks and save what is possible to save. 
This is a time of unprecedented opportunity to rethink offerings, markets, business 
processes, and organizational structure and to improve them to achieve growth. Success will 
depend on leaders who are able to stabilize the company as they identify and exploit  
opportunities, find new market, create innovative new offerings, and restructure and 
reposition. Even leaders who need to make very deep cuts can think strategically about 
where the business will be and how they might build for the future. It is in this scenario that 
this study presents solutions to the survival and revival of the construction sector: 
Retrenchment (financial Restructuration, asset retrenchment, operating efficiency) ; 









6 – Bibliography 
Barker, V. III and Barr, P. 2002. "Linking Top Manager Atributtions to Strategic Reorientation 
in Declining Firms Attempting Turnarounds", Journal of Business Research, Vol.55/12. pp. 963-979 
Bibeault, D. 1982, "Corporate Turnaround", Mcgraw Hill, New York 
Boyne, G. and Meier, K. 2009, "Enviromental change, human resources and organizational 
turnaround", Journal of Management Studies, 46, 835-863 
Cameron, K.S., Sutton, R.I. & Whetten, D.A. 1988, Issues in Organizational Decline. pp 3-19, 
Readings in Organizational Decline: Frameworks research and prescriptions. BPC 
Daily, C. and Dalton, D. 1995, "CEO and director turnover in failing firms: an ilusion of 
change?", Strategic Management Journal, 16, 393-400 
El Namaki, M. S. S. 2013. “Strategic Thinking for Turbulent Times.” Ivey Business Journal, 
(August), 1-7. 
Filatotchev, I. and Toms, S. 2006, "Corporate governance and financial constrains on strategic 
turnarounds", Journal of Management Studies, 43, 407-433 
Freeman, S.J., & Cameron, K.S. 1993, "Organizational downsizing: a convergence and 
reorentation framework". Organization Science, 4, 10-29 
González-Bravo, MI and Arjola Mecaj. 2011. "Structural and Evolutionary Patterns of 
Companies in a Financial Distress Situation."Advances in Decision Sciences, 2011. 
Gopinath, C. 1991, "Turnaround: recognizing decline and initiating intervention", Long Range 
Planning, 4 (6): 96-101 
Hambrick, D. and Schecter, S. 1983, "Turnaround strategies for mature industrial product 
business units", Academy og Management Journal, 26, 231-248 
Hofer, C. 1980 "Turnaround strategies", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol 1, 19-31 
Hoffman, R.C. 1989, "Strategies for Corporate Turnarounds: What do we know about them?", 
Journal of General Management, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 46-47 
Latham, Scott and Michael Braun. 2011. "Economic Recessions, Strategy, and Performance: A 





Lim, Dominic SK; Nikhil Celly; Eric A Morse and W Glenn Rowe. 2013. "Rethinking the 
Effectiveness of Asset and Cost Retrenchment: The Contingency Effects of a Firm's Rent Creation 
Mechanism." Strategic Management Journal, 34(1), 42-61. 
Morrow, J. Simon, D. Hitt, M. and Holcomb, T. 2007 "Creating value in the face of declining 
performance", Strategic Management Journal, 28, 271-283 
O'Callaghan, Shaun. 2011. "Leading after a Crisis." Human Resource Management 
International Digest, 19(2), 3-4. 
Pearce, John A and D Keith Robbins. 1992. "Turnaround: retrenchment and 
recovery." Strategic Management Journal, Vol 13, 287-309. 
Pearce, John A and D Keith Robbins. 2008. "Strategic Transformation as the Essential Last 
Step in the Process of Business Turnaround." Business Horizons, 51(2). 
Pearce, John A and Keith Robbins. 1993. "Toward Improved Theory and Research on Business 
Turnaround." Journal of Management, 19(3), 613-36. 
Pearce, John A. and D. Keith Robbins. 1994. "Retrenchment Remains the Foundation of 
Business Turnaround." Strategic Management Journal, 15(5), 407-17. 
Schmitt, Achim and Sebastian Raisch. 2013. "Corporate Turnarounds: The Duality of 
Retrenchment and Recovery." Journal of Management Studies, 50(7), 1216-44. 
Schoenberg, Richard; Nardine Collier and Cliff Bowman. 2013. "Strategies for Business 
Turnaround and Recovery: A Review and Synthesis." European Business Review, 25(3), 243-62. 
Sudardanam, S. and Lai, J. 2001 "Corporate financial distress and turnaround strategies: an 
empirical analysis", British Journal of Management, Vol 12, pp. 193-199. 
Tikici, Mehmet; Ece Omay; Neslihan Derin; Seyda Nur Seçkin and Mehmet 
Cüreoğlu. 2011. "Operating Turnaround Strategies During Crisis Periods: A Research on 
Manufacturing Firms." Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 24, 49-60. 
Whetten, David A. 1987, "Growth and decline processes in organizations", annual review of 
sociology 
Zook, C. 2007. “Finding your Next Core Business.” Harvard Business Review, 85(4), 66-75. 
